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The market structure of oncology care is undergoing dramatic consolidation. Little work 
has examined how market structure impacts oncology care. This study has three objectives: (1) 
investigate the effect of market structure on geographic access to care for patients receiving 
infused chemotherapy; (2) investigate the impact of market structure on Medicare reimbursement 
for patients receiving infused chemotherapy; and (3) evaluate how the market structure impacts 
the speed of diffusion in the use of new high- and low-value treatments for patients. 
Using a 20% sample of Medicare Fee-For-Service claims from 2008 to 2014, we 
identified a cohort of 142,770 patients receiving infused chemotherapy for cancer and 89,096 new 
users of chemotherapy. We assessed relationships between 1) competition and the number of 
chemotherapy-administering physicians within 25, 50, and 75 miles of the patient’s zip code and 
the distance traveled to receive chemotherapy, 2) competition and Medicare expenditures for 
infused chemotherapy, and 3) competition and diffusion of new treatments.  
We find that a one standard deviation increase in logged Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) (i.e., market becoming less competitive) increases the average distance traveled from 100 
to 112 miles and decreases the average number of physicians within 75 miles from 346 to 312 
physicians. When examining spending, we find that spending decreases as markets become less 
competitive at the claim service-line level and the day level but is not impacted when looking at 
total spending in the six months following treatment initiation. Finally, we examined five newly 
approved medications or existing medications with new indications: (nab-paclitaxel, 
bendamustine, degarelix, temsiroliimus, and bevacizumab) and find that the impact of competition 
on the diffusion of a new treatment varies by treatment. Nab-paclitaxel, a lower value drug, 
diffuses slower as markets become less competitive, whereas bendamustine, a higher value 
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drug, diffuses faster as markets become less competitive. We do not find significant associations 
between market competition and drug diffusion for the other drugs studied.  
Competition impacts patients’ geographic access to care. The association between 
competition and healthcare spending and diffusion of medications is not consistent. Future 
research should examine how competition impacts patients’ access to care in other clinical areas, 
drivers for increased spending in consolidated areas, and the quality of care is impacted by 
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CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW 
Specific Aims 
Hospital mergers and acquisitions have dramatically increased since 2010 and are 
projected to continue to increase in the coming years [1]. By merging with other hospitals and 
buying physician practices, expanding hospitals are improving their market advantage by 
decreasing competition [2]. Hospital mergers and acquisitions have uniquely affected cancer 
care. Since 2006, 35% of community oncology clinics have merged or entered into a financial 
relationship with a hospital [3]. As a result, more chemotherapy is received in hospital outpatient 
settings rather than physician offices [4]. This shift in site of care (i.e., moving from office-based to 
outpatient) can result in Medicare paying more for the same service [5]. In 2005, 13.5% of 
chemotherapy was delivered in a hospital setting versus 33% in 2013 [3]. Despite this substantial 
change, little to no research has examined how cancer care consolidation has impacted cost, 
quality, and access to care for patients. Previous research on healthcare market competition in 
various settings has found an association between reduced competition, increased prices, and 
reduced quality of care [6–8]. Additionally, understanding how competition impacts patient 
geographic access to care is an understudied area [9].  
The long-term goal of this research is to understand how hospital mergers and 
acquisitions impact cancer care and costs. The objective of this study is to understand how 
consolidation of cancer care is associated with access, cost, and quality for patients with cancer. 
The central hypothesis is that cancer care consolidation results in reduced geographic access for 
patients, increased Medicare spending, and improved quality of care. The rationale for this study 
is that the organization of hospital systems and cancer care is rapidly changing, yet little attention 
has been focused on how these changes impact patient care and healthcare costs. As 
competition decreases, I hypothesize that: (1) patient access to care will decrease because 
chemotherapy services will be provided at fewer locations with differential effects based on 
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geographic area; (2) spending will increase due to shifting the site of care from physician offices 
to the outpatient hospital setting; and (3) treatments will diffuse faster in consolidated markets 
because larger organization have more standardized treatment protocols. Understanding how 
hospital and provider consolidation impacts oncology access, costs, and quality will be important 
to inform the future regulation of healthcare markets.  
Aim 1: To assess the effect of consolidation on access to chemotherapy for 
patients with cancer.  
Hypothesis: Consolidation will reduce the number of providers that are in close 
geographic proximity (< 75 miles) to patients and increase distance traveled for patients living 
outside of large urban areas. 
Aim 2: To examine the effect of cancer care consolidation on Medicare spending 
for infused chemotherapy and overall spending.  
Hypothesis: Consolidation will be positively associated with Medicare spending for 
infused chemotherapy as well as overall spending.  
Aim 3: To examine the effect of cancer care consolidation on the use of new high-
and low-value treatments.  
Hypothesis: Hospital consolidation will be associated with increased use of high-value 
services and decreased use of low-value drugs.  
The implications of these findings are significant. Currently, the benefits of consolidation 
are being debated by academics and government officials [1, 10, 11]. This study can directly 
inform policymakers as to whether cancer care consolidation affects access to chemotherapy, 
increases the spending for chemotherapy for patients with cancer, and affects diffusion of new 
treatments.  
Executive Summary 
Mirroring changes happening in the broader healthcare marketplace, the organization of 
cancer care is changing, with hospitals merging (horizontal integration) and hospitals acquiring 
physician practices (vertical integration) [12]. Recent research has found that there has been 
substantial vertical integration in recent years, which has resulted in a doubling of the proportion 
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of hospital-owned practices (from 30% of all practices in 2004 to close to 60% in 2015) [12]. 
There is debate within the health policy community on the impact of consolidation. Supporters 
argue that consolidation will result in improved care coordination for patients and improve the 
quality of care while others believe this may limit patient choice and reduce care quality due to 
reduced competitive pressures [13].  
There has been limited empirical research to examine how the recent wave of 
consolidation impacts patients. The existing literature focused on spending for commercially 
insured patients, finding that reduced competition increases spending [6, 14]. This body of work 
has not examined whether competition is associated with geographic access to care for patients, 
the impact on spending for Medicare patients, and the quality of care provided.  
This study contributes to the cancer health services literature by assessing the impact of 
competition on cancer care. This dissertation has three objectives: 1) to assess the relationship 
between competition and geographic access to care; 2) to assess the relationship between 
competition spending; and 3) to examine if consolidation impacts the rates of adoption of new 
medications in relation to their estimated value. 
To achieve these objectives, we used generalized linear model with the appropriate link 
and distribution to assess the relationships between 1) competition and distance travelled to 
chemotherapy and the number of physicians providing chemotherapy geographically close, 2) 
competition and spending for chemotherapy at the claim-line, day of service, and total spending 
for a treatment episode level (six months after initiating chemotherapy), and 3) competition on the 
diffusion of new chemotherapy agents and explore if value impacts the relationship. For Aims 1 
and 2 we include market-level fixed effect to control for time invariant observable and 
unobservable factors that may be associated with the geographic distribution of care and 
reimbursement for services. Additionally, in Aim 2 we include fixed effects for each drug 
administered to control for spending differences that could be driven by the drug administered.  
In Aim 1, we found that a one standard deviation increase in log HHI (i.e., a market is 
less competitive) increases the average distance traveled from 100 to 112 miles 
(coefficient=0.07; 95% CI=0.06, 0.07) and decreases the average number of physicians within 75 
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miles from 346 to 312 (coefficient = -0.09; 95% CI= -0.10, -0.07). Furthermore, when models are 
stratified by urbanicity, we found that the association is larger in urban over non-urban areas for 
distance traveled (urban areas, coefficient =0.26, 95% CI=0.25, 0.27; non-urban areas, coefficient 
=0.05, 95% CI=0.04, 0.05) and number of providers (urban areas, coefficient =-0.16, 95% CI=-
0.19, -0.13; non-urban areas, coefficient =-0.07, 95% CI=-0.09, -0.05).  
These findings suggest that a patient’s geographic access to care decreases as markets 
become less competitive. This finding is particularly important for chemotherapy, because 
patients need to repeatedly travel to facilities to receive infused chemotherapy and prior work has 
found that travel distance can result in reduced adherence to chemotherapy regimens [15]. 
Additionally this finding is notable because, to our knowledge, it is the first study to examine how 
geographic access to care is impacted by market competition.  
In Aim 2, we found that a one standard deviation increase in log HHI (i.e., a market is 
less competitive) decreased line-item claim-level spending by 1.58 percentage points (coefficient 
=  -0.07; 95% CI=-0.10, -0.03) and decreased day of service spending by 1.02 percentage points 
(coefficient=-0.04; 95% CI=-0.07, -0.01) but was not associated with six month total episode-
based spending (coefficient =0.04; 95% CI= -0.01, 0.09).  
This finding was counter to our hypothesis that as a market grew more concentrated 
spending would increase. Because we controlled for drug received, differences in specific drugs 
used between settings are likely not driving this counterintuitive result. Our empirical results show 
oncology care consolidation only slightly impacted spending at the claim or day level but did not 
impact overall spending.  
Findings from this study suggest that decisions to consolidate were not driven by being 
able to bill Medicare at higher rates. Rather, consolidation may be driven by other 
reimbursement-related factors such as the 340B program, which allows most hospitals to buy 
chemotherapy drugs at deeply discounted rates. However, recent studies have found that the 
340B program was not associated with hospitals buying community practices [12]. Therefore, if 
hospitals are not purchasing community oncologists to benefit from the 340B program, this fact 
along with findings from the current study suggest that vertical integration decisions may have 
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been driven by other factors. These factors could be related to payment reform such as 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and bundled payments from Medicare. Other factors 
could include favorable reimbursement from private insurers or private insurers increasing use of 
narrow networks [12].  
Finally, in Aim 3, we hypothesized that reduced competition would be associated with 
faster diffusion of high-value drugs and slower diffusion of low-value drugs. We examined five 
newly approved medications or existing medications with new indications approved (paclitaxel, 
bendamustine, degarelix, temsiroliimus, and bevacizumab) and found that the impact on the 
diffusion varies by treatment. Nanoparticle albumin-bound (nab)-paclitaxel, a low-value drug, 
diffuses slower as markets become less competitive whereas bendamustine, a high-value drug, 
diffuses faster as markets become less competitive. For bevacizumab, degarelix, and 
temsirolimus—a low-, moderate-, and high-value drug, respectively—we do not find significant 
associations between market competition and drug diffusion. 
This study found mixed evidence on the influence of competition on the diffusion of new 
medications. Paclitaxel, a low-value drug, was used less in less competitive markets whereas the 
high-value bendamustine was used more in less competitive areas. Looking at these two 
medications, it may suggest that there is greater centralized control in consolidated markets, 
which encourages use of high-value medications. However, given the small number of drugs 
examined and inconsistent findings across studied treatment the findings should be interpreted 
with caution. Additional research should be done to examine if this finding is consistent for other 









CHAPTER 2. STUDY RATIONALE 
Background 
Consolidation in the Healthcare Marketplace  
There has been a dramatic increase in hospital mergers and acquisitions since 2008 and 
this trend is predicted to continue, with one-fifth of hospitals forecasted to merge within the next 
five years [1, 16]. A recent study found that over 250 mergers and acquisitions occurred in 2013 
[16]. Hospital mergers are expected to improve hospitals’ financial performance by allowing them 
to negotiate for higher prices from private payers and by improving efficiency. Prior work has 
found that mergers can result in cost-savings for hospitals generated from a combination of 
increased efficiency due to economies of scale and more generous reimbursements from private 
payers [17–19]. If providers and hospitals spend these profits on the services they provide, 
consolidated hospitals could improve the quality of care they deliver. Furthermore, the quality of 
care for procedures could improve where there is a strong relationship between volume and 
outcomes, such as surgical outcomes for cancer patient [20]. Despite significant recent changes 
in the structure of the oncology market via hospital consolidation, there has been little work to 
evaluate its impact on patients. The goals of the proposed study are to provide policymakers and 
stakeholders with evidence that can be applied to inform potential regulation of healthcare 
markets and to describe the relationship between oncology market structure access to, quality of, 
and costs of cancer care.  
Competition and Access to Care for Cancer Patients (Aim 1)  
Although the research base on the geographic distribution of chemotherapy providers is 
limited, a consistent finding is that there are significant geographic disparities in access to cancer 
care [21–23]. Most of the prior research in this area uses data that are over a decade old and do 
not capture recent changes in market structure. A more recent study using data from the late 
2000s found that there were significant geographic disparities in access to care for colorectal 
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cancer patients needing chemotherapy. Specifically, geographic disparities in access to care 
impacted the use of chemotherapy because people with increased travel times were less likely to 
use chemotherapy [15]. Although this work establishes a foundation for research on the impact of 
geographic care disparities, gaps remain on the role that market structure plays in the geographic 
distribution of care. For example, hospitals can buy private oncology practices and keep the 
facilities open or they can consolidate cancer services at central locations.  
The proposed analysis for Aim 1 of this dissertation will contribute to the existing 
literature by examining how changes in market structure have impacted geographic access to 
care for patients receiving infused chemotherapy. Further, this study may shed light on the impact 
of market structure on access to care more broadly, such as dialysis services, an area of 
research that is historically limited.  
Competition and Medicare Spending on Health Services Received by Patients with Cancer 
(Aim 2)  
Since 2008, roughly 700 private oncology practices have been bought by hospitals, 
resulting in more patients being seen in hospital outpatient departments and fewer patients seen 
in physician offices [4, 16, 24]. From 2008 to 2012, the amount of chemotherapy provided in 
hospital outpatient departments has increased by over 60% [24, 25]. This shift in delivering 
chemotherapy infusions within the outpatient rather than an office-based setting is expected to 
increase healthcare spending per infusion because Medicare reimburses hospital outpatient 
services at a higher rate than physician offices. This may result in increased spending for infused 
chemotherapy as well increased overall spending. Industry reports suggest that the costs a 
Medicare patient incurs for being treated at a hospital outpatient department are 13% to 20% 
higher when compared to treatment received at a physician’s office [4, 24, 25]. These prior 
analyses may be biased, however, because they do not fully account for observable differences 
in patient populations and unobservable differences in markets, both of which affect the cost of 
care provided to patients.  
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Changes the Diffusion of High- and Low-Value Chemotherapies and the Impact of 
Competition (Aim 3)  
Little research has explored how market structure impacts cancer care [26], or the 
influence of market structure on health service delivery more broadly. Although there is a body of 
literature that finds increased competition increases quality for Medicare beneficiaries [7], there is 
little research that examines the diffusion of new treatments or medication by market structure. 
The small body of literature across clinical areas finds that market structure does impact the 
diffusion of a new treatment and that competition is associated with faster rates of diffusion due to 
competitive pressures, but this body of work has not examined how value impacts diffusion [27–
31]. However, there is an argument in favor for hospital consolidation that theorizes that the 
quality of care will improve because larger organizations will be able to implement system-wide 
quality control, however this claim has not been tested [1].  
Study Rationale 
Substantial debate exists within the oncology community on how to best improve the 
value of care provided with much of the debate focused on the rising costs of new drugs [32]. 
However, many system-level factors have been, so far, under-researched, including that of 
whether provider market structure impacts the access to, costs of, and quality of care provided. 
This study is innovative in its use of rigorous methods to examine how the changing market 
structures due to acquisitions, mergers, and consolidations impact access to, costs of, and quality 
of cancer care. 
Although industry reports have found that the amount of chemotherapy received in a 
hospital has more than doubled in the past 10 years [3], this finding has not been confirmed from 
other studies and no work has examined factors associated with this change. And although there 
is a substantial body of work related to how Medicare spending is impacted by the site of care for 
services (i.e., hospital outpatient or physician office) [33] and it is believed that cancer care 
consolidation will result in increased hospital outpatient-based care [3], to date there are no 
empirical studies to test if this is true. This study will directly test if consolidation is changing 
cancer care spending.  
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The role that the provider market structure plays in geographic access to care for patients 
is unknown. Recent work has found that distance to care impacts patients’ use of chemotherapy, 
but no work has examined factors that are contributing to changes in geographic access [15]. 
This study will provide new knowledge about how a changing provider marketplace influences 
geographic access to care. 
This project will also generate new knowledge on the role of the provider market structure 
in the diffusion of new treatments where there has been little research in context of cancer [26] or 
in other clinical areas [27, 29, 30]. Furthermore this study is unique in examining the value of the 
treatment that has previously been ignored. This study will examine how market structure impacts 








CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
Overview 
The goal of this study is to determine the effect of competition on access, Medicare 
spending, and quality for patients with cancer. However, the main exposure of interest, market 
competition, may be endogenous. For example, high-quality hospitals may have better financial 
performance and thus may capture a larger market share. To address this potential problem, we 
created an exogenous measure of competition based on variation in the distance between 
patients and providers, which allows us to find a causal relationship between market structure 
and outcomes. The study will use a 20% random sample of fee-for-service Medicare claims from 
2007 to 2014. We will include patients that receive infused chemotherapy for a cancer-related 
indication between 2008 and 2014. Aim 1 will explore how consolidation impacts patient 
geographic access to chemotherapy providers. Aim 2 will explore the relationship between 
consolidation and Medicare expenditures. Aim 3 will examine if consolidation impacts the rates of 
adoption of new medications in relation to their estimated value.  
Conceptual Model 
A conceptual model was developed for this study that highlights the relationship between 
provider competition and access to care, spending, and quality of care (see Figure 3.1). This 
model depicts the interrelatedness of market structure to other outcomes. The solid lines between 
factors show the relationships the study will investigate while the dashed lines show relationships 
that are believed to exist but are sources of endogeneity. This model illustrates that the market 
structure directly impacts quality of care, site of care, and access to care. The model then shows 
that the site of care will directly impact the amount of Medicare expenditures for services and that 
the quality of care could influence the market structure, potentially due to higher quality providers 
attracting more patients. Additionally, it is expected that there is a relationship between increased 
Medicare expenditures and quality of care if hospitals take the additional revenue and invest it 
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into their cancer services. This would then likely improve quality of care, which could again impact 
the overall market structure. We operationalize each aim as described below:  
Aim 1 assesses how market structure changes could impact the geographic location of 
providers in relation to patients. We hypothesize that as providers are consolidated within hospital 
systems and the marketplace becomes less competitive, there will be fewer locations offering 
infused chemotherapy, which will reduce geographic access to cancer care for patients and result 
in longer travel times. We will examine if this result is consistent across urban (county population 
1 million or more) and non-urban areas.  
Aim 2 examines how market structure impacts the site in which care is delivered (i.e., 
physician’s office or hospital outpatient setting) and how this ultimately may change Medicare 
expenditures.  
Aim 3 explores the relationship between market structure and impact on the delivery of 
high-value care. For this Aim, we use the diffusion of new medications of higher versus lower 
value. 
Data  
The data for this study were obtained using the 20% random sample of the Medicare 
Standard Analytic Files, which includes all Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. We identified a 
prevalence cohort of cancer patients that used infused chemotherapy between 2008 and 2014. 
Using the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) hierarchical clinical 
classification (HCC) software we identified claims as being cancer-related based on the 
International Classification of Disease version 9 (ICD-9) codes [34]. Chemotherapy use will be 
identified by Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) J9XXX codes.  
To identify markets for chemotherapy, we examined all of the chemotherapy provided 
within a market and assigned each chemotherapy claim to a practice. A practice can be a 
physician practice, hospital, or even an individual physician; we define a practice based on the 
tax identification number (TIN) included on the submitted claim. Use of chemotherapy was 
measured using Medicare Part B claims for outpatient and physician services. For chemotherapy 
delivered in non-hospital–affiliated outpatient settings, the physician practice (i.e., the firm) was 
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determined by the TIN, which was recorded on the claims. Additionally, the location of where the 
service was provided is recorded on the claim for non-hospital–affiliated outpatient claims. For 
chemotherapy provided in hospital-affiliated outpatient settings, the TIN and location of the TIN 
are not directly provided on the claim but the national physician identifier (NPI) is available. Using 
the NPI and the Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Specialty (MD-PPAS) and National Plan 
and Provider Enumeration System (NPPES), we linked NPI to a TIN using MD-PPAS and 
practice zip code using NPPES to determine the location and practice information for an 
encounter. If a physician is associated with more than one TIN, we selected the TIN with the 
largest percentage of total claims submitted to Medicare.  
We included patient demographic and enrollment information from the Medicare 
Beneficiary Summary File, which includes demographic and enrollment information about patients 
and zip code of residence. We used the U.S. Census Tiger files to identify the latitude and 
longitude coordinates for each zip code centroid [35]. 
Sample 
We created a prevalence cohort of cancer patients that received physician-administered 
chemotherapy or hormonal therapy between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2014. Eligible 
individuals were enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B when they received chemotherapy. There 
were 142,770 individuals meeting these criteria and eligible for inclusion in Aim 1. From this 
sample, we created a new user cohort of cancer patients with who were continuously enrolled in 
FFS Medicare Parts A and B for six months before and after their first chemotherapy claim, 
creating a six-month washout period and an analytic sample of 86,039 individuals. These 
individuals were included in Aim 2. For Aim 3, we subset the Aim 2 cohort to create disease-
specific cohorts (breast, lung, chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), kidney, and prostate cancer) 
and their chemotherapy use (breast N=9,499; lung N=4,645; CLL N=2,194; kidney N=1,002; 
prostate N=22,810). We categorized drug-indication pairs as high- or low-value based on an 
assessment from Memorial Sloan Kettering’s Drug Abacus, a recently developed tool that 
describes the value of a treatment based on price, life expectancy, and side-effect profile. The 
tool and related value assessment is built on recent work by Howard et al [36]. We recognize that 
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our assignment of value is limited by the lack of rich clinical information that would tell us if the 
drug is prescribed exactly as indicated by the FDA.  
To create measures of competition, we identified all patients who received any 
chemotherapy administered for an indication of cancer during the study period. For Aim 1, we 
used this prevalence cohort and estimated the distance a patient traveled from their residence zip 
code to the zip code of the point-of-service delivery. For Aim 2, we examined spending for new 
users of chemotherapy. In Aim 3, we examined the proportion of patients receiving a specified 
new treatment as a proportion of all chemotherapy uses among patients with the cancer of 
interest. For example, among patients with breast cancer within a month, we divided the number 
of patients receiving bevacizumab by the total number of individuals who have breast cancer and 
received any chemotherapy within the month.  
Key Variables  
The main independent variable in our analysis was the competitiveness of a market. We 
measured competition based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) [37]. The HHI measures 
the market structure by squaring the volume shares of a practice within a market. The HHI can 
range from 0 to 10,000, where the larger the number, the more concentrated and less competitive 
the market. An HHI of 1,500 or less is considered a competitive market. Because it is not clear 
what constitutes a market for cancer care, we constructed markets both at the core-based 
statistical area (CBSA) and Hospital Referral Region (HRR) level [38]. We used the prevalence 
cohort of patients and all chemotherapy claims when calculating the HHI to reflect the size of the 
market. We defined practices based on the TIN listed for the physician administering 
chemotherapy and their market share as the number of chemotherapy infusions administered by 
the practice.  
Because directly measuring market structure may be influenced by unobservable aspects 
of quality of care, we created an HHI that aims to minimize this bias using the following steps [37, 
39, 40]:  
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1. Create a choice set for patients that will include all practices (i.e., firms based 
on unique TINs) within 75 miles of a patient’s zip code. In sensitivity analysis, 
we used 25 or 50 miles to test if the results were sensitive to this assumption.  
2. Using this choice set, we estimated a patient choice model. Using a 
conditional logit model, we modeled patient choice as a function of distance 
between the patient and practice, distance squared, number of physicians 
associated with the practice (based on the number billing under the TIN), the 
total annual charges from the practice, charges squared, and year. This 
model was run separately for each region (northeast, south, central, and 
west) to ensure model convergence. 
3. We used the estimates from the patient choice model to generate the 
predicted probability that the patient would use each practice in the patient’s 
choice set. However, the number of physicians and charges of a practice 
may be associated with the quality of the practice. To overcome this bias, 
when predicting the probability of seeing a practice we set the number of 
physicians and charges to the means of that patient’s choice set.  
4. The predicted probabilities were summed across patients to generate the 
predicted number of patients that would go to each practice. We calculated 
the market share for each practice by dividing the number of patients seen at 
each practice by the number of patients within the market. 
5. We then squared each practice’s market share and sum the market share 
across all practices within a market (CBSA or HRR) to generate the level of 
competition (measured as HHI) for that market.  
Because this measure of HHI is purely a function of the geographic distribution of a patient 
and practices, it does not reflect market share differences due to quality variation across 
providers. This measure mitigates the causal relationship between market structure and the 
unobservable aspect of quality of care, which may otherwise bias our results.  
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For Aims 1 and 2, we used the constructed HHI (described previously) and then log HHI 
to ensure that small changes in HHI (i.e., a hospital acquiring a community oncologist) and large 
changes in HHI (i.e., hospitals merging) are captured.  
For Aim 3, we did not use the same approach described previously to model HHI. Instead 
we chose to use the directly measure HHI with all results being interpreted as associations. This 
allows us to describe how actual market competition was associated with diffusion of 
medications, which will better describe how competition was associated with the diffusion of a 
medication. Additionally, this analysis is targeted toward a clinical audience and the interpretation 
of directly measuring market structure is more accessible to that audience. We segmented the 
HHI into quartiles and modelled the relationship as a categorical variable to allow for non-
parametric relationships between competition and use of new treatments over time.  
Patient-level covariates are drawn from the Medicare enrollment and claims files. Using 
the enrollment file, we measured age, race (white, black, other), gender, year, and an urban 
indicator (county population > 1 million). For Aims 2 and 3, we measured comorbidities using data 
contained in the Medicare Parts A and B claims files and the comorbidity index developed by 
Klabunde and colleagues [41]. For Aims 1 and 2, we included fixed effects for the market area 
based on the beneficiary’s zip code of residence to control for time invariant market factors. For 
Aim 2, we included fixed effects for the drug used (from the claims files) to ensure that any 
differences in spending were due to differences in reimbursement levels between markets and 
not due to differences in the expenditures for the drugs administered.  
In Aim 1, the dependent variables were the distance traveled by a patient from their home 
to their site of cancer treatment and the number of physicians providing chemotherapy close (<75 
miles) to a patient. To measure the distance travelled by patients to receive care, we used the 
patient residence zip code from the enrollment file and the practice zip code derived from the 
claims or NPPES file to measure the Euclidian distance in miles between centroids. In Aim 2, the 
dependent variable was total Medicare spending as well as patient liability at the line-item claim, 
day, and total six-month level (which was recorded in claims). All spending was inflated to 2014 
U.S. dollars using the consumer price index (CPI). In Aim 3, the dependent variable was the use 
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of a new drug among the patient population that could benefit from the treatment 
(breast/bevacizumab; lung/nab-paclitaxel; CLL/bendamustine; kidney/temsirolimus; 
prostate/degarelix) as observed from claims.  
Analytic Approach 
The analytic approach for Aims 1, 2, and 3 is outlined below. Overall, we used two 
approaches to identify the competitiveness of a market. In Aims 1 and 2, we created competition 
measures by using a patient choice model, where a patient’s preference and likelihood of 
receiving chemotherapy from a practice were based on the distance between patients and 
practices. This approach ensures that the competition measures do not suffer from endogeneity. 
However, in Aim 3, we did not use a patient choice model to create the competition measure but 
instead directly measured competition. Therefore, this analysis simply describes what has 
occurred.  
 
Aim 1. To Assess the Effect of Consolidation on Access to Chemotherapy for Patients with 
Cancer  
We examined the relationship between competition with the number of practices within 
75 miles of the patient and the distance a patient traveled to receive care. Based on model fit, we 
used a log link and negative binomial distribution when examining the number of chemotherapy 
administering physicians and a log link and Poisson distribution when examining the distance 
traveled to a provider.  
Because urban patients are more likely to reside in competitive areas, we ran models that 
were stratified by urbanicity. Primary models controlled for patients’ demographic characteristics 
and included fixed effects for the market. The market fixed effect provides HHI coefficients that 
are “within-estimates”—meaning that the HHI coefficient(s) would only be impacted if the 
competitiveness of a market changes during the study period. These market area fixed effects 
control for any time invariant factors within a market that could confound the findings. This 
approach provides the most conservative estimates of the impact of competition. In sensitivity 
analyses we removed the market area–level fixed effects and instead used a generalized 
estimating equation (GEE) model to account for the correlated error within a market. 
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Aim 2. To Examine the Effect of Cancer Care Consolidation on Medicare Spending for 
Infused Chemotherapy and Overall Spending  
We examined the relationship between competition and spending for chemotherapy at 
the claim-line level, day level, and treatment episode level (six months after treatment initiation). 
Generalized linear models were used to assess the relationship between competition and 
Medicare expenditures. We performed modified Park tests to determine the appropriate 
distribution of the mean-variance relationship. Based on the results of these tests, we used a log 
link and Poisson distribution. All models controlled for patient characteristics and market area 
fixed effects (either CBSA or HRR) and fixed effects for the drug administered. The market fixed 
effect provides HHI coefficients that are “within-estimates” as explained previously. Additionally, 
using fixed effects for the drug administered ensured that differences seen are not driven by 
differences in the drugs administered but rather by differences in reimbursements for the same 
services. 
Aim 3. To Examine the Effect of Cancer Care Consolidation on Use of New High- and Low-
Value Treatments  
We analyzed the association between competition and diffusion of new medications 
using a generalized linear model using a log link and binomial distribution and clustered the 
standard errors at the patient level to account for repeated observations during the analysis 
period. For each outcome model we included patients’ age, race, gender, Klabunde modification 
of the Charlson comorbidity score, an urban indicator (county population > 1 million), and time. 
Time was measured as quarter of calendar year since the FDA approval of the medication. If a 
unique HCPCS code was not assigned to the treatment when it was approved, we started time 
once the HCPCS code was approved. Additionally, we ran models with an interaction term for 
time with HHI quartile to examine if the slope of the diffusion curve varied by quartile.  
We altered this approach when examining the diffusion of one medication, bevacizumab. 
During our study period the FDA indicated that the harms of bevacizumab were likely to outweigh 
the benefits for patients with breast cancer. To account for this, we use an interrupted time series 
analysis where we included the previously mentioned covariates and also include a dummy for 
“time after” and a running variable for the “time since” bevacizumab was reported as being 
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harmful. We ran models that allowed for interactions of HHI quartiles and the “time after” dummy 
and the “time since” running variable. Additionally, because bevacizumab was approved for use 
for other indications before 2008, we included the use of bevacizumab in 2007 within a market 
(CBSA or HRR) for any cancer to account for prior practice patterns.  
We also tested for differences in the diffusion of a medication by value. To do this, we ran 
a pooled model that included all drugs except bevacizumab. In this model, we included a 
categorical variable for “value” and interacted value with time to test if high- or low-value drugs 
diffuse faster or slower. Additionally, we allow for a three-way interaction between value, time, 
and HHI to examine if the competitiveness of a market impacts diffusion of high- and low-value 






















CHAPTER 4. INVESTIGATING THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN COMPETITION AND 
GEOGRAPHIC ACCESS TO CHEMOTHERAPY AMONG CHEMOTHERAPY USERS 
Introduction  
Geographic access to care (in this case, the availability of relevant healthcare providers 
that are close to a patient) can influence patients’ use of and adherence to treatments [21, 23, 
42–44]. This is particularly of interest in the area of cancer care because oncologists are not 
evenly distributed across the country and patients may need to repeatedly travel to oncologists to 
receive chemotherapy [21, 23, 45]. Prior research has found an association between increased 
early detection of and survival from cancer and living in areas with an increased availability of 
physicians [46–48]. Furthermore, increased travel time to providers is associated with a 
decreased likelihood of having received adjuvant chemotherapy for patients with colorectal 
cancer or receiving breast-conserving therapy for breast cancer patients [15, 22, 49].  
Mirroring changes happening in the broader healthcare marketplace, the organization of 
cancer care is changing, with hospitals merging (horizontal integration) and hospitals acquiring 
physician practices (vertical integration) [12]. Recent research has found that there has been 
substantial vertical integration in recent years with the proportion of hospital-owned oncology 
practices increasing from less than 30% of practices in 2004 to close to 60% in 2015 [12]. There 
is debate within the health policy community on the impact of integration. Supporters argue that 
integration will result in improved care coordination for patients and improve the quality of care 
while others believe this may limit patient choice and reduce care quality due to reduced 
competitive pressures [13].  
The limited empirical research on the effect of this recent wave of consolidation has 
focused on spending for commercially insured patients. This body of work has consistently found 
that spending increases when markets become more consolidated [6, 14]. However, there has 
been no work to examine whether changes in area-level competition is associated with 
geographic access to care for patients. Specifically, consolidation could reduce the number of 
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available providers or the location where the providers practice because merging/acquired 
practices could remain at their original locations or be moved to a centralized location. This study 
aims to understand how competition is associated with patients’ geographic access to care in two 
ways: 1) examining the association between market competition and the distance a patient 
travels to receive care, and 2) examining the association between competition and the number of 
providers relatively close to a patient. 
Methods  
Data  
We used a random 20% sample of Medicare fee-for-service claims. We created a 
prevalence cohort of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries that received infused chemotherapy 
at a hospital outpatient department or physician office between 2008 and 2014. To identify a 
chemotherapy claim, we required that beneficiaries had a cancer-related International 
Classification of Disease, Ninth Edition (ICD-9) code and a Healthcare Common Procedure 
Coding System (HCPCS) code starting with J9XXX on the same claim. Eligible beneficiaries were 
enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B when receiving chemotherapy (N=142,770). Our study was 
approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
Variables  
The primary outcome variables were the distance travelled to receive chemotherapy and 
the number of physicians providing chemotherapy within 75 miles of a patient with additional 
sensitivity analysis conducted at the 25- and 50-mile thresholds. We measured the Euclidian 
distance between the centroid of the patient’s zip code and the centroid of the physicians’ zip 
code. We identified the patient’s zip code from the enrollment file based on when the patient 
initiated chemotherapy. To identify the location where chemotherapy was provided we used 
Medicare Part B claims for outpatient and physician services. For chemotherapy delivered in non-
hospital–affiliated outpatient settings, the zip code of the chemotherapy service provider is 
recorded on the claim. For chemotherapy provided in hospital affiliated outpatient settings, the zip 
code is not available directly on the claim. Therefore, we identified the performing physician’s zip 
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code by linking the physician’s national physician identifier (NPI) to the National Plan and 
Provider Enumeration System data, which provides the physician’s zip code. 
The main independent variable in our analysis was competitiveness of the area. We 
measured competition based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI measures the 
market structure by squaring volume shares of a practice within a market. Because a precise 
measure of the cancer care market does not yet exist, we constructed markets at the core-based 
statistical area (CBSA) and Hospital Referral Region (HRR). We used the prevalence cohort of 
patients and all chemotherapy claims when calculating the HHI to reflect the size of the market. 
We defined firms (practices) based on the tax identifcation number (TIN) listed for the physician 
administering chemotherapy and their market share as the number of chemotherapy infusions 
administered by the practice. Because the TIN is not provided on outpatient hospital claims, for 
these providers we used the Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Specialty (MD-PPAS) files 
to obtain this information. If a physician is associated with more than one TIN, we selected the 
TIN with the largest percentage of total claims submitted to Medicare. However for all non-
hospital–affiliated claims, the TIN is provided and we do not need to link to MD-PPAS to assign 
physicians to a practice. 
Because directly measuring market structure may be influenced by unobservable aspects 
of quality of care, we created an HHI that aims to minimize this bias using the following steps [37, 
39, 40]:  
1. Create a choice set for patients that will include all practices (i.e., practices) 
within 75 miles of a patient’s zip code. In sensitivity analysis, we used 25 or 
50 miles to test if the results were sensitive to this assumption.  
2. Using this choice set, we estimated a patient choice model. Using a 
conditional logit model, we modeled patient choice as a function of distance 
between the patient and practice, distance squared, number of physicians 
associated with the practice (based on the number billing under the TIN), the 
total annual charges from the practice, charges squared, and year. This 
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model was run separately for each region (northeast, south, central, and 
west) to ensure model convergence. 
3. We used the estimates from the patient choice model to generate the 
predicted probability that the patient would use each practice in the patient’s 
choice set. However, the number of physicians and charges of a practice 
may be associated with the quality of the practice. To overcome this bias, 
when predicting the probability of seeing a practice we set the number of 
physicians and charges to the means of that patient’s choice set.  
4. The predicted probabilities were summed across patients to generate the 
predicted number of patients that would go to each practice. We calculated 
the market share for each practice by dividing the number of patients seen at 
each practice by the number of patients within the market. 
5. We then squared each practice’s market share and sum the market share 
across all practices within a market (CBSA or HRR) to generate the level of 
competition (measured as HHI) for that market.  
Because this measure of HHI is purely a function of the geographic distribution of a 
patient and practices, it does not reflect market share differences due to quality variation across 
providers. This measure mitigates the causal relationship between market structure and 
unobservable aspect of quality of care, which may otherwise bias our results.  
The HHI can range from 0 to 10,000, where the larger the number, the more 
concentrated and less competitive the market. An HHI of 1,500 or less is considered a 
competitive market. We log HHI which ensures that both small (i.e., a hospital acquiring a 
community oncologist) and large (i.e., hospitals merging) changes in HHI will be captured. 
For each outcome model we included patients’ age, race (black, white, other), gender, 
year, and an urban indicator (county population > 1 million). Because urban patients are more 
likely to reside in a competitive area, we also ran models that were stratified by urbanicity.  
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Statistical Analysis  
Generalized linear models were used to assess the relationship between competition and 
the number of chemotherapy providers and the distance travelled to a provider, controlling for 
patient characteristics and market area fixed effects (either CBSA or HRR). The market fixed 
effect provides HHI coefficients that are “within-estimates”—meaning that the HHI coefficient will 
only be impacted if the competitiveness of a market changes during the study period. These 
market area fixed effect control for any time invariant factors within a market that could confound 
the findings. This will provide us with the most conservative estimate of the impact of competition. 
In sensitivity analysis we remove the area-level fixed effects and instead used a generalized 
estimating equation (GEE) model to account for the correlated error within a market.  
We used a negative binomial model for estimating the number of chemotherapy-
administering physicians available within a 75-mile radius from the patient’s zip code. We 
conducted sensitivity analysis where the outcome was modified to look at the number of 
chemotherapy administering physicians within 25 or 50 miles. We used a log link and Poisson 
distribution for estimating the distance travelled by each patient who received chemotherapy. The 
model distributions were selected based on model fit as measured by the Alkaline Information 
Criteria and Bayesian Information Criteria [50].  
Results 
Characteristics of the 142,770 individuals receiving infused chemotherapy included in our 
cohort are presented in Table 4.1. The mean age of patients was 75 (Standard Deviation (SD): 
7), which was similar between urban and non-urban patients. The majority of the population was 
white (84%), however there were more black patients in urban areas when compared to non-
urban areas (11% vs 7%; P<0.01). Overall, most patients resided in competitive areas, with HHI 
under 1,500. However, urban areas were more competitive than non-urban areas. On average, 
there were 398 (SD: 452) physicians that provide chemotherapy to Medicare patients within a 75-
mile radius of a patient’s zip code. There were fewer chemotherapy physicians for non-urban 
patients when compared to urban patients (non-urban=188, SD:243; urban =566, SD: 507). The 
mean distance patients traveled for chemotherapy was 100 miles (SD: 252), however the 
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distribution of miles traveled was quite skewed—three-quarters of patients travel 29 or fewer 
miles for chemotherapy.  
Distance Traveled  
When considering the role of market competition on the distance traveled for 
chemotherapy (Table 4.2), we found that a one standard deviation increase in log HHI (i.e., a 
market is less competitive) increases the average distance travelled from 100 to 112 miles when 
markets are created at the CBSA-level (coefficient=0.07; 95% CI=0.06-0.07). The association is 
larger when measuring markets at the HRR level (coefficient=0.14; 95% CI=0.13-0.14). 
Furthermore, when models are stratified by urbanicity, we found that the association is larger in 
urban over non-urban areas when markets were constructed at the CBSA level (urban areas, 
coefficient =0.26, 95% CI=0.25-0.27; non-urban areas, coefficient =0.05, 95% CI=0.04-0.05) and 
at the HRR level (urban areas, coefficient =0.26, 95% CI=0.25-0.27; non-urban areas, coefficient 
=0.10, 95% CI=0.10-0.11).  
Distance Traveled Sensitivity Analysis  
Analyses using GEE models found that increased market concentration was associated 
with increased distance travelled (Table 4.2). These results were consistent across models. 
However, the effect estimates were larger overall and in non-urban areas when compared to 
results from the fixed effect models, and the estimates were less precise. Additionally, in the GEE 
models we did not observe significant heterogeneity on the impact of competition between urban 
and non-urban areas. This sensitivity analysis confirms the primary analysis and demonstrates 
that the main finding is not impacted by modelling assumptions.  
Number of Physicians Providing Chemotherapy  
When looking at the association between market competition and the number of 
physicians that provide chemotherapy (Table 4.3), we found that a one standard deviation 
increase in log HHI (i.e., a market is less competitive) decreases the average number of 
physicians within 75 miles from 346 to 312 at the CBSA-level (coefficient = -0.09; 95% CI= -0.10 - 
-0.07). The association is larger when measuring markets at the HRR level (coefficient = -0.17; 
95% CI= -0.19 - -0.15). When models are stratified by urbanicity, we found that the result was 
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larger in urban compared to non-urban areas when measuring markets at the CBSA-level (urban 
areas, coefficient =-0.16, 95% CI=-0.19 - -0.13; non-urban areas, coefficient =-0.07, 95% CI=-
0.09 - -0.05), but not when measuring markets at the HRR level (urban areas, coefficient =-0.18, 
95% CI=-0.21 - -0.15; non-urban areas, coefficient =-0.17, 95% CI=-0.19 - -0.14).  
Number of Physicians Providing Chemotherapy Sensitivity Analysis 
We conducted two sets of sensitivity analyses: 1) calculating the number of physicians 
providing chemotherapy within 25 or 50 miles rather than 75 miles (Table 4.4), and 2) conducting 
analyses using a GEE model instead of a fixed effects model (Table 4.4). When varying the 
distance for the number of physicians, we find consistent but slightly larger results. For example, 
we find that a one standard deviation increase in log HHI decreases the average number of 
physicians within 25 miles from 100 to 81 physicians at the CBSA-level (coefficient=-0.17; 95% 
CI=-0.20 - -0.15). When using GEE models, we also found consistent but larger associations 
(coefficient=-0.84; 95% CI=-0.92 - -0.76). The GEE models did not observe significant 
heterogeneity between urban and non-urban areas. Again, these sensitivity analyses confirms the 
primary analysis and demonstrates that the main finding, decreasing competition is associated 
fewer physicians near a patient, is not impacted by modelling assumptions. 
Discussion  
Although prior work has documented the impact of geographic access to care for cancer 
patients, little if any work has explored structural mechanisms and their contributions to the 
geographic distribution of practices. In this study we aimed to explore the relationship between 
market competition among oncology providers and patients’ geographic access to care. First, we 
found that most fee-for-service Medicare patients do not travel far for chemotherapy. We observe 
that 50% of patients travel 12 or fewer miles to receive chemotherapy, with similar median 
distances travelled between urban and non-urban patients (11 and 15 miles, respectively). 
However, the top quartile of urban patients travels 23 or more miles while non-urban patients 
travel 41 miles or more. These results are consistent with prior studies, which find that 54% of 
Stage III colorectal patients travel 12.5 miles or less for adjuvant chemotherapy [15]. Additionally, 
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when examining the number of physicians that provides chemotherapy, we find that non-urban 
patients have fewer providers with a mean of only 28 providers within 25 miles.  
We find that increases in market concentration reduce geographic access to 
chemotherapy for chemotherapy users. Our first finding from the adjusted analysis is that markets 
become less competitive as the distance travelled to chemotherapy increases. Our second 
finding from the adjusted analysis exploring patient choice found reduced competition is 
associated with fewer physicians close to patients. We test this finding using a variety of 
sensitivity analyses and find consistent results. These findings suggest that a patient’s 
geographic access to care decreases as markets become less competitive.  
Our finding is consistent with news reports where hospital executives justify mergers 
stating that they will “eliminate duplication—for example by consolidating cardiac care or cancer 
treatment at one site” [10]. This argument states consolidation, and the resulting reduced 
competition, is justified because chemotherapy will be provided at one site, which will increase 
efficiencies and likely reduce costs for the hospital. However, this argument ignores how 
geographic access will be reduced. This finding is particularly important for chemotherapy 
services because patients need to repeatedly travel to facilities to receive infused chemotherapy 
and prior work has found that travel distance can result in reduced adherence to chemotherapy 
regimens [15]. Additionally this finding is significant because, to our knowledge, it is the first study 
to examine how geographic access to care is impacted by market competition.  
Our study had several limitations. First, we only examined fee-for-service Medicare 
beneficiaries. It is unknown whether our findings generalize to younger privately insured patients 
or Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in an HMO. Second, when chemotherapy was provided in a 
hospital-affiliated outpatient setting, the practice (as measured by the TIN) was not provided on 
the claims. We were able to determine the practice the physician was associated with by linking 
the NPI to the MD-PPAS file, which identifies the practice(s) (TIN) that the physician billed to. 
However, roughly 20% of physicians bill to more than one practice. When this occurred we 
assigned the physician to the modal TIN (the practice in which they billed most frequently). When 
examining the proportion of claims billed to the top practice (TIN) for a physician compared to all 
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others, we found that 80% of their claims were billed to the top practice (TIN). This results in only 
4% of claims at risk for misclassification, which should not substantially impact the creation of 
competition measures. Third, because existing literature has not established a definitive 
geographic market, we attempted to account for this by creating markets at both the CBSA and 
HRR levels and found our results were consistent across geographic market definitions.  
This study demonstrates that market competition is associated with variation in 
geographic access to care but does not assess the impact of reduced access to care on patient 
outcomes, as previous studies have done [15, 21, 51]. Future studies should assess how 
consolidation and the resulting decreased access to care impacts use of cancer treatments and 
patient outcomes. Healthcare administrators should consider how acquisitions and mergers may 
lead to potentially reduced access to care when assessing the potential consequences of 
consolidation. Although hospitals may improve their financial performance under consolidated 
delivery systems, this research suggests that patients’ access to care may suffer under less 




Table 4.1. Sample Characteristic of Fee-for-Service Medicare Cancer Patients Using 
Chemotherapy Between 2008 and 2014 
  All Areas Urban Non-Urban 
N 142,770 79,172 63,598 
Age 75 (7) 75 (7) 75 (7) 
Male, % 58% 57% 58% 
Race 
   White 84% 81% 89% 
Black 9% 11% 7% 
Other 6% 8% 3% 
HHI with CBSA Defined Markets 683 (939) 218 (193) 1,244 (1,152) 
HHI with HRR Defined Markets 412 (434) 198 (157) 654 (513) 
Number of MDs Providing 
Chemotherapy 
    Within 25 Miles 138 (212) 226 (250) 28 (35) 
 Within 50 Miles 270 (341) 416 (384) 89 (136) 
 Within 75 Miles 398 (452) 566 (507) 188 (243) 
Distance Travelled 
   Mean, SD 100 (252) 87 (239) 117 (267) 
Median, IQR 12 (6 - 29) 11 (5 - 23) 15 (7 - 41) 
Year 
   2008 13% 13% 14% 
2009 12% 12% 12% 
2010 13% 13% 13% 
2011 14% 13% 14% 
2012 14% 14% 14% 
2013 17% 18% 17% 
2014 16% 17% 16% 
 
Note: HHI=Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; CBSA=core based statistical area; HRR=Hospital 
referral region. HHI is used to measure market completion and is constructed as described in the 




Table 4.2. Coefficients of the Association of Log HHI to Distance Traveled to Care 
 All Urban Non Urban 
Distance Travelled to Provider, Fixed Effect Model 
CBSA Market 0.07 (0.06, 0.07) 0.26 (0.25, 0.27) 0.05 (0.04, 0.05) 
HRR Market 0.14 (0.13, 0.14) 0.26 (0.25, 0.27) 0.10 (0.10, 0.11) 
Sensitivity Analysis: Distance Travelled to Provider, GEE Model 
CBSA Market 0.24 (0.16, 0.31) 0.25 (0.14, 0.37) 0.22 (0.13, 0.31) 
HRR Market 0.24 (0.14, 0.34) 0.25 (0.10, 0.40) 0.23 (0.09, 0.36) 
Note: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; CBSA=core based statistical area; HRR=Hospital referral 




Table 4.3. Coefficients of the Association of Log HHI to Number of Chemotherapy Administering 
Physicians 
 All Urban Non Urban 
Number of Chemotherapy Administering Physicians Within 75 Miles, Fixed Effect Model 
CBSA Market -0.09 (-0.1, -0.07) -0.16 (-0.19, -0.13) -0.07 (-0.09, -0.05) 
HRR Market -0.17 (-0.19, -0.15) -0.18 (-0.21, -0.15) -0.17 (-0.19, -0.14) 
Sensitivity Analysis: Number of Chemotherapy Administering Physicians Within 75 
Miles, GEE Model 
CBSA Market -0.81 (-0.88, -0.74) -0.77 (-0.86, -0.68) -0.87 (-0.97, -0.77) 
HRR Market -0.84 (-0.95, -0.72) -0.86 (-1.01, -0.71) -0.80 (-0.97, -0.64) 
 Note: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; CBSA=core based statistical area; HRR=Hospital referral 






Table 4.4. Adjusted Risk Ratios of the Association of Log HHI to Number of Chemotherapy 
Administering Physicians Within 50 and 25 Miles 
 All Urban Non Urban 
Number of Chemotherapy Administering Physicians Within 50 Miles, Fixed Effect Model 
CBSA Market -0.16 (-0.17, -0.14) -0.20 (-0.23, -0.17) -0.15 (-0.17, -0.13) 
HRR Market -0.23 (-0.25, -0.20) -0.24 (-0.27, -0.21) -0.22 (-0.26, -0.19) 
Sensitivity Analysis: Number of Chemotherapy Administering Physicians Within 50 
Miles, GEE Model 
CBSA Market -0.90 (-0.95, -0.84) -0.84 (-0.90, -0.78) -0.99 (-1.08, -0.90) 
HRR Market -0.87 (-0.98, -0.76) -0.92 (-1.05, -0.79) -0.81 (-1.00, -0.61) 
Panel B: Number of Chemotherapy Administering Physicians Within 25 Miles, Fixed 
Effect Model 
CBSA Market -0.17 (-0.20, -0.15) -0.26 (-0.31, -0.21) -0.16 (-0.18, -0.13) 
HRR Market -0.23 (-0.26, -0.20) -0.27 (-0.32, -0.22) -0.23 (-0.27, -0.18) 
Panel B Sensitivity Analysis: Number of Chemotherapy Administering Physicians Within 
25 Miles, GEE Model 
CBSA Market -0.84 (-0.92, -0.76) -0.83 (-0.95, -0.72) -0.85 (-0.93, -0.78) 
HRR Market -0.78 (-0.90, -0.66) -0.95 (-1.08, -0.81) -0.50 (-0.68, -0.31) 
Note: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; CBSA=core based statistical area; HRR=Hospital referral 












CHAPTER 5. EXAMINING THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN COMPETITION AND SPENDING 
FOR MEDICARE CANCER PATIENTS  
Introduction 
Over the past two decades spending on cancer care has dramatically increased, with 
much of this increase attributed to costly treatments. As the population continues to age, the 
number of people with cancer requiring treatment will also increase [52, 53]. These two trends, 
higher cancer care costs and the growing number of people diagnosed and treated for cancer, 
have particular impact on the Medicare program [53, 54]. Recent analyses suggest that $1 in $12 
spent on fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries is spent on cancer care [55]. However, research 
examining the costs of cancer has focused primarily on technological innovation and patient 
characteristics with little work examining other factors that can influence the cost of cancer care 
[53, 56–58].  
Mirroring changes happening in the broader healthcare marketplace, the organization of 
cancer care is changing, with hospitals merging (horizontal integration) and hospitals acquiring 
physician groups (vertical integration) [12]. Recent research has found that there has been 
substantial vertical integration in recent years, which has resulted in hospital-owned oncology 
practices being less than 30% of the market in 2004 to close to 60% in 2015 [12]. Supporters of 
market consolidation argue that consolidation will result in improved care coordination for patients 
and improve the quality of care, but critics contend that consolidation will give hospitals 
disproportionate bargaining power and will result in higher reimbursements for privately insured 
patients [1, 13]. Although providers cannot directly negotiate to increase their Medicare 
payments, they can take actions to increase the reimbursable amount they receive from 
Medicare. First, most hospitals can purchase chemotherapy at deeply discounted prices due to 
the 340B program [12, 59–61]. Second, hospitals may be able to change an acquired clinic’s 
status from a physician’s office to a hospital outpatient department (HOPD) whose Medicare 
reimbursements are often 50% higher [5, 33, 62]. These factors illuminate the potential 
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advantages of consolidation to hospitals and clinics. However, there has been little research to 
examine if reduced market competition in providing chemotherapy infusions has resulted in 
higher spending for cancer patients. The objective of this study was to examine if reduced market 
competition is associated with higher spending for similar services.  
Methods  
Sample 
We used a random 20% sample of Medicare fee-for-service claims. We identified new 
users of infused chemotherapy who were fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries between 2008 
and 2014. To identify a chemotherapy claim, we required that beneficiaries had a cancer-related 
International Classification of Disease, Ninth Edition (ICD-9) code and a Healthcare Common 
Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) code starting with J9XXX on the same claim. We classified 
beneficiaries as being a new user of chemotherapy using a six-month wash-out period. 
Furthermore, we required that beneficiaries were continuously enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B 
during the wash-out period and for at least six months after initiating chemotherapy (N=86,039). 
We required the six-month post-chemotherapy follow-up period to examine spending during a 
“treatment episode” as defined by the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation for the 
Oncology Care Model [63, 64].  
Variables 
The primary outcome was total healthcare spending, including payments made by 
Medicare and the patient (either paid directly by the patient or through supplemental insurance 
coverage). We measured healthcare spending in three ways. First, we examined the spending for 
chemotherapy at the line-item level, using only the spending for the HCPCS code for the infused 
drug. Second, we summed all outpatient spending recorded on the same service day as the drug 
infusion to capture payments for chemotherapy administration as well as office visits with 
physicians and other reimbursed services. Third, we examined all healthcare spending (inpatient, 
outpatient, hospice, durable medical equipment, and home health) starting on the first day of 
infusion through six months after initiation of chemotherapy, mirroring the chemotherapy 
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treatment episode as defined by the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation for the Oncology 
Care Model [63, 64]. All costs were converted to 2014 dollars using the consumer price index. 
The main independent variable in our analysis was the competitiveness of a market. We 
measured competition based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) [37]. The HHI measures 
the market structure by squaring the volume shares of a practice within a market. The HHI can 
range from 0 to 10,000, where the larger the number, the more concentrated and less competitive 
the market. An HHI of 1,500 or less is considered a competitive market by the federal trade 
commission. Because it is not clear what constitutes a market for cancer care, we constructed 
markets at the core-based statistical area (CBSA) and Hospital Referral Region (HRR) level. We 
used the prevalence cohort of patients and all chemotherapy claims when calculating the HHI to 
reflect the size of the market. We defined practices (i.e., firms) based on the tax identification 
number (TIN) listed for the physician administering chemotherapy and their market share as the 
number of chemotherapy infusions administered by the practice.  
We are concerned that practices with high shares are correlated with higher quality 
practices because patients are more likely to choose higher quality providers. Therefore, because 
directly measuring market structure may be influenced by unobservable aspects of quality of 
care, we created an HHI that aims to minimize this bias using the following steps [37, 39, 40]:  
1. Create a choice set for patients that will include all practices within 75 miles 
of a patient’s zip code. In sensitivity analysis, we used 25 or 50 miles to test if 
the results were sensitive to this assumption.  
2. Using this choice set, we estimated a patient choice model. Using a 
conditional logit model, we modeled patient choice as a function of distance 
between the patient and practice, distance squared, number of physicians 
associated with the practice (based on the number billing under the TIN), the 
total annual charges from the practice, charges squared, and year. We 
included provider size because we believe that patients may prefer larger 
practices because they are more likely to have had a prior interaction with 
the facility for other non-cancer–related health care. This model was run 
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separately for each region (northeast, south, central, and west) to ensure 
model convergence. 
3. We used the estimates from the patient choice model to generate the 
predicted probability that the patient would use each practice in the patient’s 
choice set. However, the number of physicians and charges of a practice 
may be associated with the quality of the practice. To overcome this bias, 
when predicting the probability of visiting a practice we set the number of 
physicians and charges to the means of that patient’s choice set.  
4. The predicted probabilities were summed across patients to generate the 
predicted number of patients that would go to each practice. We calculated 
the market share for each practice by dividing the number of patients seen at 
each practice by the number of patients within the market. 
5. We then squared each practice’s market share and sum the market share 
across all practices within a market (CBSA or HRR) to generate the level of 
competition (measured as HHI) for that market.  
Because this measure of HHI is purely a function of the geographic distribution of a 
patient and practices, it does not reflect market share differences due to quality variation across 
providers. This measure mitigates the causal relationship between market structure and 
unobservable aspects of quality of care that may otherwise bias our results.  
We log HHI, which ensures that both small (i.e., a hospital acquiring a community 
oncologist) and large (i.e., hospitals merging) changes in HHI will be captured. 
Covariates included patients’ age, race (black, white, other), gender, year, and an urban 
indicator (county population > 1 million). We also included fixed effects for the drug used to 
ensure that any differences seen are not driven by differences in the drugs used but instead by 
differences in reimbursements for services provided. For the six-month spending models, we 
included fixed effects for the first chemotherapy drug received. 
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Statistical Analysis  
Generalized linear models were used to assess the relationship between competition and 
healthcare spending. We used a log link for all models and Poisson distribution for the mean-
variance relationship based on the results of the modified Park test. All models controlled for 
patient characteristics and market area fixed effects (either CBSA or HRR) and the line-item claim 
and service day models include fixed effects for the drug administered. The market fixed effect 
provides HHI coefficients that are “within-estimates”—meaning that the HHI coefficient will only 
be impacted if the competitiveness of a geographic market changes during the study period. 
These market area fixed effects control for any time invariant factors within a market that could 
confound the findings, providing a conservative estimate of the impact of competition. 
Additionally, using fixed effects for the drug administered will ensure that differences seen are not 
driven by differences in the drugs administered but rather differences in reimbursements for the 
same services.  
Results 
Characteristics of the 86,039 individuals included in our cohort are presented in Table 
5.1. The mean age of patients was 76 (Standard Deviation (SD):7) and the majority of the 
population was white (91%). Overall, most patients resided in competitive areas as measured by 
the HHI(mean is under 1,500). On average, line-item spending on chemotherapy was $1,973 
(SD: $2,633), service day spending was $2,196 (SD: $2,870), and six-month treatment episode 
spending was $31,382 (SD: $29,851). 
When considering the role of market competition on healthcare spending we found that 
competition has small but statistically significant associations at the line and day level but not did 
not have an impact on six-month spending (Figure 5.1). When examining the line-item claim level 
(Table 5.2), we found that a one standard deviation increase in log HHI (i.e., market becomes 
less competitive) decreased spending by 1.58 percentage points when markets are created at the 
CBSA-level (coefficient =-0.07; 95% CI=-0.10, -0.03). The association was larger when 
measuring markets at the HRR level (coefficient=-0.11; 95% CI=-0.16, -0.06). We saw similar 
results when measuring healthcare spending at the service day level; we found that a one 
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standard deviation increase in log HHI is associated with a 1.02 percentage point decrease in 
healthcare spending when markets were created at the CBSA-level (coefficient=-0.04; 95% CI=-
0.07, -0.01). Similarly, the association was larger when measuring markets at the HRR level 
(coefficient =-0.07; 95% CI=-0.11, -0.03). However, when examining the association of 
competition on total six-month healthcare spending for a treatment episode (Table 5.2), we did 
not find a statistically significant association when measuring markets at the CBSA level 
(coefficient =0.04; 95% CI= -0.01, 0.09) or at the HRR level (coefficient =0.01; 95% CI= -0.04, 
0.05).  
Discussion 
This study documents the association between market competition and spending for 
chemotherapy services. We found at the chemotherapy claim and day of chemotherapy service 
level that spending decreased as consolidation increased, however when we looked at six-month 
total spending by competition level, this difference was no longer statistically significant. This 
finding was counter to our hypothesis that as a market grew more concentrated spending would 
increase. Because we controlled for drug received, we know that differences in specific drugs 
used are not driving the result. Our empirical results show oncology care consolidation only 
slightly impacted spending at the claim or day level but did not impact overall spending at all.  
In this study, we observe spending but not profits from provided services. We believe that 
one driver of consolidation is to increase positive margins. Hospitals generate positive margins 
when they purchase independent physician offices because hospitals can purchase 
chemotherapy at deeply discounted prices through programs such as 340B while being 
reimbursed at the same or higher rates for chemotherapy by third-party payers. Interestingly, one 
recent study found that the 340B program was not associated with hospitals buying community 
practices [12]. If this finding is confirmed by other studies, then it suggests that vertical integration 
decisions may have been driven by other factors related to payment reform such as Accountable 
Care Organizations (ACOs) and bundled payments from Medicare as well in attempted response 
to private insurers increasing use of narrow networks [12].  
Our study had several limitations. First, we only included fee-for-service Medicare 
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beneficiaries and it is unclear if our findings generalize to younger privately insured patients or 
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in an HMO. Second, the practice with which a physician was 
affiliated (as measured by the TIN) was not provided when chemotherapy was provided in a 
hospital-affiliated outpatient setting. However, we were able to determine the practice the 
physician was associated with by linking the NPI to the MD-PPAS file, which identifies the 
practice(s) (TIN) that the physician billed to. It is worth mention that roughly 20% of physicians bill 
to more than one practice, but when this occurred we assigned the physician to the modal TIN 
(the practice in which they billed most frequently). Moreover, when examining the proportion of 
claims billed to the top practice (TIN) for a physician compared to all others, we found that 80% of 
their claims were billed to the top practice (TIN). This results in a minimal risk of misclassification, 
with only 4% of claims at risk, which should not substantially impact the creation of competition 
measures. Third, existing literature has not established a definitive geographic market for 
chemotherapy. We attempted to account for this by creating two markets definitions, at the CBSA 
and HRR levels. We found that our results were consistent across geographic market definitions. 
These limitations notwithstanding, we present novel findings that increased competition is 
associated with marginally higher or similar spending on chemotherapy and related services 
reimbursed by Medicare. This finding was contrary to our initial expectations and may provide 
comfort to policymakers and regulators who have expressed concerns about consolidation efforts 
being used solely to increase Medicare reimbursement rates [65]. However, this study is limited 
to examining how competition impacts spending while competition may also impact patients’ 
access to care, spending for private payers, and the quality of care patients receive. Future 
research is needed to examine how spending for privately insured patients is impacted by 
oncology care consolidation to give regulators and policy makers a full picture of the impact of 




Table 5.1. Sample Characteristic of Fee-for-Service Medicare Beneficiaries Using Chemotherapy 
Between 2008 and 2014. 
  All Areas   
N 86,039   
Age 76 (7)   




White 91%   
Black 6%   
Other 3%   
Charlson Comorbidity Index    
 0 77%   
 1  12%   
 2+ 11%   
HHI with CBSA Defined Markets 441 (433)   
HHI with HRR Defined Markets 692 (936)   
Line-Item Claim Spending $1,973 ($2,633)   
Service Day Spending $2,196 ($2,870)   
Six Month Spending $31,382 ($29,851)   
Chemotherapy Initiation Year 
 
  
2008 14%   
2009 13%   
2010 14%   
2011 14%   
2012 15%   
2013 20%   
2014 10%   
Note: All values in parenthesis are standard deviations. HHI=Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; 
CBSA=core based statistical area; HRR=Hospital referral region. HHI is used to measure market 
completion and is constructed as described in the above text. Based on a 20% random sample of 




Table 5.2: Coefficients of the Association of Log HHI and Health Care Spending 
 Line Item Claim Service Day Six Month Episode 
 CBSA Market -0.07 (-0.10, -0.03) -0.04 (-0.07, -0.01) 0.03 (-0.01, 0.07) 
 HRR Market -0.11 (-0.16, -0.06) -0.07 (-0.11, -0.03) 0.04 (-0.01, 0.09) 
Note: Values in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; 
CBSA=core based statistical area; HRR=Hospital referral region. HHI constructed as described in 
the above text. 
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Figure 5.1. Predicted Health Care Spending by HHI Quartile 
  
Note: Above estimates based on markets constructed using core-based statistical areas as 








CHAPTER 6. IMPACT OF COMPETITION ON THE USE OF NEW HIGH AND LOW VALUE 
CHEMOTHERAPY AGENTS 
Introduction  
The costs of cancer care are staggering [36, 54]. According to the National Cancer 
Institute, national expenditures for cancer totaled $124 billion in 2010, and this number is 
projected to increase more than 25% and reach $157 billion by 2020.[53] These cost increases 
have, at least in part, been attributed to use of more new, higher-priced agents [54]. For example, 
of the 12 FDA-approved cancer drugs in 2012, 11 were priced over $100,000 per year [66]. 
High costs of cancer care have created substantial financial burden for patients and 
payers, leading to increasingly focused discussions around the value of innovation [67–69]. That 
is, stakeholders are pursuing efforts to measure and understand whether the costs are worth the 
benefits using cost-effectiveness analysis [69, 70]. Private payers can use these types of value 
analyses to inform benefit designs to restrict use of low-value drugs among their beneficiaries, but 
Medicare cannot [71]. Medicare has to provide access to all cancer treatments and has limited 
ability to control prices or use of low-value treatments [54, 72]. There are few levers that 
policymakers have to influence the use of low-value treatments for Medicare patients directly. 
However, one often overlooked approach is to regulate hospital mergers and acquisitions, which 
is regulated by the Federal Trade Commission as along with some state regulator bodies.  
The organization of cancer care is changing, with hospitals merging with other hospitals 
(horizontal integration) and hospitals acquiring physician groups (vertical integration) [12]. Recent 
research has found there has been substantial vertical integration, with the percent of oncology 
practices owned by hospitals nearly doubling (from 30% to nearly 60%) between 2004 and 2015 
[12]. There is debate within the health policy community on the impact of consolidation. 
Supporters argue that consolidation will result in improved care coordination for patients and 
improve the quality of care, but critics contend that consolidation will result in higher healthcare 
spending.  
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One important aspect of quality of care for patients with cancer is the uptake of new high-
value treatments or discontinuation of low-value treatments. However, little research has explored 
how changing competition impacts the diffusion of new treatments [31]. Although fee-for-service 
Medicare patients will have access to all new cancer treatments under current regulations, prior 
research has found substantial variation in the diffusion of new high-cost services across 
hospitals [28, 73, 74] and has found that treatment decisions are often guided by their physicians 
[75].  
The objective of this study is to examine if changes in market competition is associated 
with the speed of diffusion for new treatments and if the value of treatment modifies the speed of 
this diffusion.  
Methods 
Data  
To examine the diffusion of new treatments, we considered all intravenously administered 
chemotherapy agents that were newly approved or previously approved but newly approved for a 
different indication between 2007 and 2011 (N=15 drugs). We then required at least 5,000 
infusions of a specific medication among patients with cancer-related diagnosis codes have 
sufficient sample size to examine changes over time. This resulted in five candidate drugs for 
analysis: bevacizumab, nab-paclitaxel, bendamustine, temsirolimus, and degarelix. For each 
drug, we examined use for a specific indication (bevacizumab/breast cancer; nab-paclitaxel/lung 
cancer; bendamustine/chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL); temsirolimus/kidney cancer; 
degarelix/prostate cancer).  
We categorized drug-indication pairs as high or low value based on an assessment from 
Memorial Sloan Kettering’s Drug Abacus, a recently developed tool that describes the value of a 
treatment based on price, life expectancy, and side-effect profile. The tool and related value 
assessment is built on recent work by Howard et al [36]. 
Sample and Outcome 
For each drug/disease pair, we identified a cohort of patients who received any infused 
chemotherapy with the disease of interest. We also required that patients be continuously 
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enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B for six months before the infusion to measure comorbidity 
(breast N=9,499; lung N=4,645; chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL) N=2,194; kidney N=1,002; 
prostate N=22,810). We classified cancer-specific chemotherapy claims based on the 
International Classification of Disease, Ninth Edition (ICD-9) code associated with the line item 
chemotherapy claim (for any Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System [HCPCS] code 
beginning with J9XXX). We then summarize a patient’s use of treatments at the person-month 
level. The outcome of interest was use of the drug of interest. Put another way, the numerator is 
the number of individuals using the drug of interest within a month and the denominator is all 
patients in the disease cohort that used any chemotherapy within a month.  
Exposure  
The main independent variable in our analysis was competitiveness of the area. We 
measured competition based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI measures the 
market structure by squaring volume shares of a practice within a market. We constructed 
markets at the Hospital Referral Region (HRR) level and conducted sensitivity analyses where 
markets were constructed at the core-based statistical area (CBSA). We used HRR as the 
primary analysis because they are large geographic areas that include both urban and rural areas 
whereas the CBSA fails to include many rural areas. We used a prevalence cohort of all cancer 
patients and all chemotherapy claims when calculating the HHI. We defined practices based on 
the tax identification number (TIN) listed for the physician administering chemotherapy and their 
market share as the number of chemotherapy infusions administered by the practice (see 
technical appendix for additional information on how physicians were assigned to practices).  
The HHI can range from 0 to 10,000, where the larger the number, the more concentrated and 
less competitive the market. An HHI of 1,500 or less is considered a competitive market. We 
separated HHI into quartiles to allow competition to have a non-linear impact on diffusion and to 
examine how treatments diffuse in markets with varying levels of competition.  
Covariates 
For each outcome model we included patients’ age, race (white or other), gender, 
Klabunde adaptation of the Charlson comorbidity score [76], urban indicator (county of residence 
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population > 1 million), and time.  Time was measured as quarter of calendar year since the FDA 
approval of the medication. If a unique HCPCS was not assigned to the treatment by the time of 
FDA approval for the indication of interest, we started time once the HCPCS was approved. 
Additionally, because bevacizumab was approved for use for other indications before 2008, we 
included the use of bevacizumab in 2007 within a market (CBSA or HRR) for any cancer to 
account for prior practice patterns. 
Statistical Analysis  
We summarized baseline characteristics of patients within each disease cohort who 
received chemotherapy. We then plotted monthly trends in the proportion of patients receiving the 
treatment of interest among all patients who received chemotherapy for the disease of interest 
during each month. 
To estimate the impact of competition on the diffusion of new medications we used 
generalized linear models with a log link and binomial distribution and clustered standard errors at 
the patient level to account for repeated observations. For each disease cohort, we ran separate 
models. We ran models with and without an interaction between time and HHI quartiles to 
examine if the slope of the diffusion curve varied. We present adjusted risk ratios (aRR) with 95% 
confidence intervals (CI) and graphed the predicted probabilities using standardized predictive 
margins using Stata 10.0 for models with statistically significant associations between HHI and 
use of the new medication [77]. 
In June 2010, the FDA communicated that it believed the harms of bevacizumab 
outweighed the benefits for patients with breast cancer, and prior research has shown that use 
declined due to this announcement [78]. To account for this event occurring during our study 
period, for this product we used an interrupted time series analysis to account for the overall time 
trend in use (time), an indicator variable for the FDA advisory month, and a continuous variable to 
measure changes in the slope for the “time since” the FDA announcement. We ran models that 
allow for interactions between HHI quartiles and each of these indicators.  
To assess if the value of medications impacted the speed of diffusion, we ran a pooled 
model of all the drugs included in the analysis (with the exception of bevacizumab since providers 
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were supposed to stop using it for breast cancer), to measure use of the new treatment. In this 
analysis, we interacted time and the value of the drug, as defined in the Drug Abacus. We will test 
if these coefficients are statistically different using a Wald test [79]. Additionally, we interacted 
value with HHI quartile and tested if they are statistically different.  
Sensitivity Analysis  
Given that it is not clear what constitutes a market for chemotherapy, we constructed 
markets at the CBSA level in addition to the HRR market. Results from this sensitivity analysis 
were consistent with the primary analysis and are not shown. 
Results  
Across all disease cohorts, we found that the majority of patients receiving chemotherapy 
are white and roughly half live in urban areas. The average age for patients across cohorts is 
between 73 and 77. Additionally, we found that patients in the lung and kidney cancer cohorts 
were more likely to have comorbidities (35.2% and 31.9% with any non-cancer comorbidity) when 
compared to the CLL, breast, and prostate cancer cohorts (19.9%, 12.8%, 15.6%). We found that 
roughly half of patients across disease cohorts live in competitive areas (HHI under 1,500).  
Diffusion of Medication:  
We found that the diffusion of medication varies by treatment (Figure 6.1), with most 
medications being increasingly used over time.  
Nab-Paclitaxel: We find that use of nab-paclitaxel for lung cancer increased from 3.6% of 
monthly chemotherapy uses in 2012 to 5% in the end of 2014. We find that market competition 
impacted the diffusion of nab-paclitaxel for patients with lung cancer. When we compared 
patients in the most competitive markets (quartile 1) to all others we found that patients’ use was 
lower in less competitive markets (quartile 2 vs quartile 1 aRR=0.49, 95% CI=(0.34-0.71); quartile 
3 vs quartile 1 aRR=0.60, 95% CI=(0.40-0.90); quartile 4 vs quartile 1 aRR=0.46, 95% CI=(0.31-
0.69)). When we examined if the slope of diffusion was impacted by competition by interacting 
competition with time, one interaction was significant—the interaction between time and the most 
consolidated quartile increases the use of treatment (aRR=1.12, 95% CI=(1.00, 1.25)). The 
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graphed predicted probabilities are shown in Figure 6.2 based on the model without an interaction 
between competition and time. 
Bendamustine: We observed that use of bendamustine for CLL increased from 21% in 
2008 to 44% of monthly chemotherapy uses in 2014. We found that market competition impacted 
the diffusion of bendamustine for patients with CLL. When we compared patient in the most 
competitive markets (quartile 1) to those in the second quartile (aRR=1.34, 95% CI=(1.13, 1.59)) 
and the most consolidated quartile (aRR=1.28, 95% CI=(1.06-1.54)), we found greater use of the 
new treatment in less competitive markets. Additionally, when we allowed for interactions 
between the time and HHI quartiles there were no significant effects. The graphed predicted 
probabilities are shown in Figure 6.2 based on the model without an interaction between 
competition and time. 
Degarelix: We found that use of degarelix for prostate cancer increased from 1.5% in 
2008 to over 14% of monthly chemotherapy uses in 2014. When we examined the association 
between competition and diffusion of degarelix for men with prostate cancer, we did not find any 
association with the level of diffusion (quartile 2 vs quartile 1 aRR=1.07, 95% CI=(0.90-1.27); 
quartile 3 vs quartile 1 aRR=0.94, 95% CI=(0.78-1.13); quartile 4 vs quartile 1 aRR=0.99, 95% 
CI=(0.73-1.07)). Additionally, when we allowed for interactions between the time and HHI 
quartiles there were no significant effects.  
Temsirolimus: From 2008 to 2014, we found that use of temsirolimus for kidney cancer 
varied significantly over time from 10% of monthly chemotherapy uses at the end of 2008 to over 
50% in the middle of 2009. When examining the association between competition and diffusion of 
temsirolimus for patients with kidney cancer, we do not find any association with the level of 
diffusion (quartile 2 vs quartile 1 aRR=1.13, 95% CI=(0.82-1.56); quartile 3 vs quartile 1 
aRR=1.09, 95% CI=(0.80-1.49); quartile 4 vs quartile 1 aRR=1.11, 95% CI=(0.81-1.53)). 
Additionally, when allowing for interactions between the time and HHI quartiles there were no 
significant effects. 
Bevacizumab: From 2008 through 2009, we observed consistent use of bevacizumab for 
breast cancer at about 6.5% of monthly chemotherapy uses. However, there was a steep decline 
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to about 2% to 3% of use in 2010 (the time of the FDA announcement) and this steadily declines 
further to less than 1% in 2012. We did not find any statistically significant associations between 
market competition and overall level of bevacizumab use.  
The Role of Value on Diffusion: When considering the role of value, we find that higher 
value drugs diffused slower than lower value drugs (aRR=0.96, 95% CI= (0.95-0.97)). However, 
when testing the relationship of market competition and the value of the medication this did not 
appear to vary by levels of market competition. 
Discussion  
Changes in the market structure for cancer care have the potential to impact the use of 
new treatments [31]. In our sample of Medicare beneficiaries using chemotherapy, use of drugs 
increased for newly approved treatments between 2008 and 2014. Interestingly, we found that 
lower value medications diffused faster than higher value medications. However, this finding may 
be unique to the medications we examined or due to the lack of available alternatives and should 
be interpreted with caution.  
This study found mixed evidence on the influence of competition on the diffusion of new 
medications. We found that use of nab-paclitaxel and bendamustine was associated with market 
competition. Nab-paclitaxel, a lower value drug, was used less in concentrated markets whereas 
the high-value bendamustine was used more in concentrated markets. Looking at these two 
medications, it may suggest that there is greater centralized control in consolidated markets, 
which encourages use of higher value medications. However, additional research should be done 
to examine if this finding is consistent for other medications and in other clinical areas.  
Our study had several limitations. First, we only examined fee-for-service Medicare 
beneficiaries. Therefore, our findings may not be generalizable to younger, privately insured 
patients or Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in an HMO. Second, when chemotherapy was 
provided in a hospital-affiliated outpatient setting the practice (as measured by the TIN) was not 
provided on the claims, however we were able to determine with which practice (TIN) the 
physician was associated using other files. Because the NPI was recorded for these claims, we 
were able to link the NPI to the MD-PPAS file, which identifies the practice(s) (TIN) that the 
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physician billed to. However, for these physicians the MD-PPAS indicates that roughly 20% of 
physicians bill to more than 1 practice. When this occurred we assigned the physician to the 
modal TIN (the practice in which they billed most frequently). We found that 80% of their claims 
were billed to the top practice (TIN) when examining the proportion of claims billed to the top 
practice (TIN) for a physician compared to all others. This results in only 4% of claims at risk for 
misclassification, which should not substantially impact the creation of competition measures. 
Third, because there are no established geographic cancer care markets, we attempted to 
account for this by creating markets at both the CBSA and HRR levels and found our results were 
consistent across geographic market definitions. 
Little research has explored how provider market structure impacts cancer care [26] and 
to our knowledge this is the first study that has examined how the market structure impacts the 
diffusion of new cancer drugs. However, prior studies outside of cancer care that examine how 
competition impacts diffusion of innovative technologies have found that competitive markets 
increase the speed of diffusion of a new treatment [27, 29–31]. Our findings demonstrate that 




Table 6.1. Sample Characteristics of Fee-For-Service Medicare Beneficiaries Between 2008 and 
2014 
 
Cancer of Interest Lung CLL Prostate Kidney Breast 
 Treatment of 
Interest 
Paclitaxel Bendamistine Degarelix Temsirolimus Bevacizumab 
N 4,645 2,194 22,810 1,002 9,499 
Age 
74.0 (5.8) 76.1 (6.9) 
77.5 
(7.4) 
74.98 (6.57) 73.63 (6.41) 
Female, % 49.8% 41.75% 0% 33% 100% 
Race      
White 91.5% 93.7% 86.5% 95.1% 90.9% 
Black 5.9% 4.8% 10.0% 3.2% 6.6% 
Other 2.7% 1.6% 3.5% 1.7% 2.5% 
Urban 53.5% 52.4% 52.0% 52.0% 55.2% 
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 
     
 0 64.8% 80.0% 87.2% 68.1% 84.4% 
 1  17.9% 9.7% 5.5% 12.5% 9.4% 
 2+ 17.4% 10.3% 7.4% 19.5 6.2% 
HHI with HRR 
Defined Markets 
2162 (1767) 2077 (1739) 
2004 
(1646) 
2069 (1710) 2048 (1709) 
 25
th
 percentile 850 795 767 899 754 
 50
th
 percentile 1488 1540 1398 1603 1448 
 75
th
 percentile 2864 2843 2598 3297 2750 
Chemotherapy 
Initiation Year 
     
2008  16.1% 14.7% 17.4% 14.6% 
2009  13.8% 11.2% 15.5% 13.8% 
2010  12.9% 14.8% 14.4% 13.2% 
2011  15.1% 14.2% 14.5% 14.6% 
2012 35.2% 15.0% 14.6% 13.0% 14.8% 
2013 44.2% 18.6% 21.0% 16.5% 19.1% 
  2014 20.6% 8.5% 9.5% 8.9% 9.9% 














Table 6.2. Adjusted Risk Ratios Showing the Association Between Competition Quartiles and the Use of New Medications 
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4645 2194 22810 1002 
Value Low High Marginal High 
Note: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; HHI markets are constructed based on hospital referral regions. For each drug, we show the adjusted 






Figure 6.2. Predicted Probabilities for the Diffusion of New Treatments with Statistically 
Significant Associations with HHI Quartile  
 
 






Table 6.3. Adjusted Risk Ratios Showing the Association Between Competition Quartiles and the 
Diffusion of Bevacizumab 
 Use of 
Bevacizumab 
HHI Quartile 1 Reference 
HHI Quartile 2 1.42 (0.66, 3.05) 
HHI Quartile 3 0.86 (0.37, 1.99) 
HHI Quartile 4 1.44 (0.66, 3.17) 
Time 0.96 (0.86, 1.08) 
Time*HHI Quartile 1 Reference 
Time*HHI Quartile 2 1.00 (0.85, 1.17) 
Time*HHI Quartile 3 1.11 (0.94, 1.30) 
Time*HHI Quartile 4 1.02 (0.87, 1.20) 
After Dummy 0.60 (0.23, 1.59) 
After Dummy*HHI Quartile 1 Reference 
After Dummy*HHI Quartile 2 1.36 (0.35, 5.25) 
After Dummy*HHI Quartile 3 0.84 (0.23, 3.05) 
After Dummy*HHI Quartile 4 0.37 (0.09, 1.54) 
After Time 0.94 (0.81, 1.09) 
After Time*HHI Quartile 1 Reference 
After Time*HHI Quartile 2 0.90 (0.73, 1.12) 
After Time*HHI Quartile 3 0.88 (0.72, 1.08) 
After Time*HHI Quartile 4 1.02 (0.83, 1.25) 











CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION  
Conclusions 
Competition and Access to Chemotherapy 
Although prior work has documented the impact of geographic access to care for cancer 
patients, little if any work has explored market factors and their contributions to the geographic 
distribution of practices. This study aimed to explore the relationship between market competition 
among oncology providers and patients’ geographic access to care. First, we found that most fee-
for-service Medicare patients do not travel far for chemotherapy. We observe that 50% of patients 
travel 12 or fewer miles to receive chemotherapy, with similar median distances travelled 
between urban and non-urban patients (11 and 15, respectively). However, the top quartile of 
urban patients travels 23 or more miles while non-urban patients travel 41 miles or more. These 
results are consistent with prior studies which find that 54% of Stage III colorectal patients travel 
12.5 miles or less for adjuvant chemotherapy [15]. Additionally, when examining the number of 
physicians that provide chemotherapy, we find that non-urban patients have fewer providers 
within 25 miles, with a mean of only 28 providers compared to 226 for urban patients.  
We find that changes in market competition impact geographic access for patients. Our 
first finding from the adjusted analysis is that as markets become less competitive the distance 
traveled to chemotherapy increases. Our second finding from the adjusted analysis exploring 
patient choice found reduced competition is associated with fewer physicians providing 
chemotherapy close to patients. We test this finding using a variety of sensitivity analyses and 
find consistent results. These findings suggest that a patient’s geographic access to care 
decreases as markets become less competitive.  
Our finding is consistent with news reports where hospital executives justify mergers 
stating that they will “eliminate duplication—for example by consolidating cardiac care or cancer 
treatment at one site” [10]. Meaning that hospitals will close some clinical locations to provide 
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care at a more centralized location in hopes of reduced overhead costs. This will reduce 
geographic access to care for patients if locations that are shut down are not close to locations 
that remain open after consolidation occurs.  
Our findings are particularly important for patients undergoing chemotherapy treatment, 
because patients need to repeatedly travel to facilities to receive infused chemotherapy and prior 
work has found that travel distance can result in reduced adherence to chemotherapy regimens 
[15]. Additionally this finding is significant because, to our knowledge, it is the first study to 
examine how geographic access to care is impacted by market competition.  
Although our study demonstrates that market competition is associated with variation in 
geographic access to care, it does not make the leap that variations in geographic access are 
linked with worse outcomes as previous studies have found [15, 21, 51]. Future studies should 
assess how consolidation and the resulting decreased access to care impacts use of cancer 
treatments and patient outcomes. Additionally, healthcare administrators and government 
regulators should consider how acquisitions and mergers may lead to potentially reduced access 
when assessing the potential consequences of consolidation as they do when considering how to 
apply Certificate of Need laws. Although hospitals may improve their financial performance under 
consolidated delivery systems, this research suggests that patients’ access to care may suffer in 
less competitive markets. Future research can play a role in examining the implications of 
consolidation for patient access and quality of care.   
Competition and Spending  
This study documents the association between market competition and spending for 
chemotherapy services. We found at the chemotherapy claim and day of chemotherapy service 
level that spending decreased as competition decreased, however when we looked at six-month 
total spending by competition level, this difference was no longer statistically significant. This 
finding was counter to our hypothesis that as a market grew more concentrated spending would 
increase. Because we controlled for drug received, we know that differences in specific drugs 
used are not driving the result.  
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In this study, we observe spending but not profit from services. We believe that one driver 
of consolidation is to increase positive profit margins. Hospitals generate positive margins when 
they purchase independent physician offices because most hospitals benefit from the 340B 
program and can purchase chemotherapy at deeply discounted prices while being reimbursed at 
the same rates. Interestingly, it is not clear that hospitals have been acquiring community 
oncologists to increase margins due to 340B. A recent study found that the 340B program was 
not associated with hospitals buying community practices [12]. If this finding is confirmed by other 
studies, then it suggests that vertical integration decisions may have been driven by other factors 
related to payment reform such as Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and bundled 
payments from Medicare in attempted response to private insurers’ increasing use of narrow 
networks [12]. 
We present novel findings that increased competition is associated with marginally higher 
or similar spending, contrary to our initial expectations. However, this study is limited to 
examining how competition impacts spending while competition may also impact patients’ access 
to care, spending for private payers, and the quality of care patient receive. Future research is 
needed to examine how spending for privately insured patients is impacted by oncology care 
consolidation to give regulators and policy makers a full picture of the impact of large-scale 
consolidation.  
Competition, Value, and the Diffusion of New Treatments  
Changes in the market structure for cancer care have the potential to impact the use of 
new treatments [31]. In our sample of Medicare beneficiaries using chemotherapy, overall we find 
that use of drugs increased for newly approved treatments between 2008 and 2014. This study 
found mixed evidence on the influence of competition on the diffusion of new medications. We 
found that competition was related to differences in diffusion of two of the five treatments studied: 
nab-paclitaxel and bendamustine. The probability of using nab-paclitaxel (a low-value drug for 
patients with lung cancer) was lower in less competitive markets whereas the probability of using 
bendamustine (a high-value drug for patients with CLL) was higher in less competitive markets. 
Looking at these two medications, it may suggest that there is greater centralized control in 
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consolidated markets, which encourages use of higher value medications. However, these results 
were not consistent in three other drug-indication scenarios studied. Additional research should 
be done to examine if this finding is consistent for other medications and in other clinical areas.  
Little research has explored how provider market structure impacts cancer care [26] and to 
our knowledge this is the first study that has examined how the market structure impacts the 
diffusion of new cancer drugs. However, from the handful of other studies outside of cancer care 
that examine how competition impacts diffusion they find that competitive markets increase the 
speed of diffusion of a new treatment [27, 29–31]. However, the existing literature has not directly 
explored how the value of a treatment is associated with diffusion. Our findings demonstrate that 
competition may impact the use of new treatments, but the estimated effect is modest. We also 
found that lower value medications diffuse slightly faster than high-value medications. This trend 
is not ideal, however the difference in rates of diffusion was relatively modest. Additionally, 
research is needed to understand the how the market competition impacts the diffusion of new 
treatments.  
Clinical and Policy Implications 
We observed that decreasing competition reduced geographic access to care, reduced 
spending on chemotherapy, and was somewhat associated with the diffusion of new treatments. 
Policy makers and hospital administrators should strongly consider how consolidation will impact 
the geographic access to care for patients and may require that acquiring hospitals assess the 
expected impact of consolidation on patients’ access to care.  
When examining the association between spending and competition we find that reduced 
competition is associated with slightly lower spending for Medicare beneficiaries receiving 
chemotherapy. This finding should provide comfort to policymakers and regulators who have 
expressed concerns about consolidation efforts being used solely to increase Medicare 
reimbursement rates. However, this study provides no information on the impact of consolidation 
on healthcare spending by private insurers and their patients.  
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When exploring how new medications have diffused we find a small but inconsistent 
association with competition. This may suggest that the diffusion of medications is driven by 
factors other than the competitiveness of a market, such as by patient or physician preference, 
which suggests that hospital administrators are not strongly directing the use of new medications 
for Medicare patients. However, this study does not provide a complete picture of the impact of 
competition on patients and future research should assess how competition impacts patients’ use 
of all types of treatments (chemotherapy, radiation, and surgery) and survival.  
Limitations 
Our study had several limitations. First, we only examined fee-for-service Medicare 
beneficiaries. It is unknown whether our findings generalize to younger, privately insured patients 
or Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in an HMO, however it is likely that geographic access to care 
will be similar across all patients because almost all providers access to fee-for-service Medicare 
patients. Second, when chemotherapy was provided in a hospital-affiliated outpatient setting the 
TIN was not provided on the claims. Therefore, we relied on MD-PPAS to identify the practice the 
physician was associated with. However, roughly 20% of physicians bill to more than one 
provider. When this occurred we assigned the physician to the modal practice (the practice in 
which they billed most frequently). When examining the proportion of claims billed to the top TIN 
for a physician compared to all others, we found that 80% of their claims were billed to the top 
TIN. This results in only 4% of claims at risk for misclassification and we believe this did not 
substantially impact the creation of competition measures. Third, because it is not clear what the 
proper geographic market is, we attempted to account for this by creating markets at both the 
CBSA and HRR levels because the existing literature has not established a definitive market 
area. However, due to the fact that our findings were consistent across definitions, we believe our 
results will be robust to changing the market definition. Fourth, this study only examines 
physician-administered medications and fails to examine orally administered anticancer 
medications.  
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Future Directions  
Understanding how competition impact patients’ geographic access to care, spending, 
and use of new treatments is imperative for informing policy makers and regulators trying to 
understand and prepare for the rapidly changing healthcare marketplace. The results of this 
dissertation provide a foundation for future research that: 
1. Understands how competition impact patients geographic access to care for 
other types of treatments (i.e., radiation and surgery) for cancer patients;  
2. Explores how patients’ adherence to chemotherapy is impacted when the 
distance to care increases due to consolidation;  
3. Explores if the quality volume relationship is consistent with prior research 
when a consolidation occurs; and  
4. Characterizes the type of mergers and acquisitions—are organizations 
merging in name only or are physicians sharing patients and using similar 
treatments? 
In addition, next steps include several specific research studies to directly extend the 
results of this dissertation by helping elucidate the type of merger or acquisition. A natural 
extension of this study could use data that better identifies if a hospital merged with another 
hospital or purchased a physician group to understand potential heterogeneity in outcomes based 
on the type of consolidation. Using network analysis, further studies could analytically 
characterize the type of mergers and acquisitions (i.e., fully integrate physicians into practice, 
acquired firm’s physicians practice independently, etc.) and examine if this drives patient 
outcomes. Other studies will examine how mergers impact low-income populations and their 
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